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Foreword 
 
Two centuries after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, the 
ILO estimates that almost 21 million people are victims of forced 
labour, of which approximately 3.7 million are found in Africa. Most 
victims are exploited by private individuals or enterprises, while an 
estimated 2 million are forced to work for state institutions or rebel 
groups. Those who exact forced labour generate vast illegal profits 
and deprive workers of the fair share of their labour. Forced labour is 
often found in sectors which are either unprotected or poorly 
protected by labour law and where informal employment 
arrangements are common. Domestic work, agriculture, 
construction, certain parts of global manufacturing, as well as the 
sex and entertainment industry are most frequently cited as 
industries prone to forced labour.  
 
The ILO’s Director-General, in his message on the International Day 
for the Abolition of Slavery (2 December 2012), reminds us that the 
struggle against slavery in its modern forms continues. These 
practices defy the principle that “labour is not a commodity” as 
affirmed by the international community in the ILO’s Constitution. He 
also called for enhanced action to end all forms of modern-day 
slavery: First, governments must implement national legislation and 
policies to address crimes of forced labour. Second, businesses and 
workers must be vigilant in preventing forced labour across supply 
chains and in identifying violations of workers’ rights. Third, barriers to 
cooperation nationally and internationally must be overcome to 
permit coordinated and mutually reinforcing action by different 
actors. Fourth, as poverty is a major contributor to the continued 
existence of forced labour, policies centred on jobs, income, and 
the establishment of nationally defined social protection floors are 
vital to end modern day slavery.  
 
Acknowledging major implementation gaps with regards to laws 
and policies against forced labour, the ILO’s Governing Body 
decided to put the issue on the agenda of the 2014 International 
Labour Conference. The objective is to discuss new standards to 
supplement the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) in 
order to strengthen prevention, protection and compensation 
measures.  
 
It is in this context that the ILO’s Special Action Programme to 
Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) and its International Programme on 
the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) seek to assess the state of 
knowledge on forced labour, human trafficking and slavery in 
Africa, as a background to the Lusaka conference that will consider 
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best practices and suggest a way forward in the continent’s fight 
against them. This report provides a snapshot of what is currently 
known about coercive labour practices in Africa, what is and is not 
happening in response, and what should be considered to take the 
battle forward. 
 
We would like to express our appreciation to all those who 
contributed to this report, in particular to Mr. Neil Howard (ILO 
consultant), who is the main author of this paper, along with several 
colleagues from ILO headquarters and field offices. 
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Introduction  
 
The main goal of this report is to assess the contemporary state of 
knowledge regarding forced labour, human trafficking and slavery 
in Africa, as well as to examine efforts to eradicate them. As such, 
the major methodological approach was qualitative, involving an 
intensive literature search, review, and synthesis of relevant 
documents concerning these issues and the policies related to 
them.  
 
Documents were obtained from a wide array of sources. Notably, 
the ILO’s catalogue of existing research and its databases on 
forced labour and legal frameworks were important. Additionally, 
secondary sources were gathered from international organisations, 
NGOs and governments active in this field. Uniquely, the report also 
draws on a significant body of academic research, both primary 
and secondary. Finally, the report also draws on a large body of 
interview material from interviews conducted for this report and for 
related research, with officials and academics who have 
experience studying or working against forced labour, human 
trafficking and slavery. Interviewees were purposively sampled in 
light of their experience. 
 
A draft report was first prepared and discussed with a group of 
expert practitioners at the ILO’s headquarters in Geneva. This draft 
was subsequently revised to reflect the results of that consultation as 
well as the continual feedback the author received from a range of 
other reviewers. 
 
The report begins, in Chapter 1, with a discussion of key terms used. 
In Chapter 2, the report reviews current knowledge on forced 
labour, human trafficking and slavery-like practices, pointing also to 
the many significant gaps in research and understanding around 
these issues. Chapter 3 focuses in detail on governmental, civil 
society and business initiatives to prevent or protect, and it offers a 
critical discussion of where these efforts fall short. In Chapter 4, the 
report concludes with suggestions as to where we can go from 
here. 
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Chapter 1 - Definitions and their discontents 
1.1 International Instruments 
 
Slavery, servitude and slavery-like practices are defined and 
outlawed by a number of international instruments. The first, and still 
most important, is the Slavery Convention, adopted in Geneva in 
1926. In Article 1 of this convention, slavery is defined as follows:  
 
‘(a) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.  
 
(b) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the 
capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to 
reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition 
of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts 
of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a 
view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every 
act of trade or transport in slaves’. 
 
In Article 2, the High Contracting Parties agree to undertake:  
 
(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;  
 
(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, 
the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms’. 
 
In 1956, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
extended the definition of slavery established under the 1926 
Convention, drawing on the language of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), to include institutions and practices 
deemed ‘analogous to slavery’. According to Article 1, these 
include:  
 
‘(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition 
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services 
or of those of a person under his control as security for a 
debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed 
is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the 
length and nature of those services are not respectively 
limited and defined; 
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(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status 
of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement 
bound to live and labour on land belonging to another 
person and to render some determinate service to such 
other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to 
change his status; 
 
(c) Any institution or practice whereby: 
 
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or 
given in marriage on payment of a consideration in 
money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or 
any other person or group; or 
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has 
the right to transfer her to another person for value 
received or otherwise; or 
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to 
be inherited by another person; 
 
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young 
person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or 
both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another 
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the 
exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour’. 
 
Human Trafficking has a similarly rich conceptual and definitional 
history. The first global instrument to address it was the early 
Twentieth Century International Agreement for the Suppression of 
the White Slave Trade, which ‘aimed to combat the compulsive 
and abusive procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes 
abroad’. In 1910, the reach of this Agreement was expanded to 
also cover ‘domestic trafficking’, while further definitional additions 
were secured in 1921, 1933 and 1941.  
 
In the year 2000, after an increase in civil society and governmental 
attention to the issue of forced and exploitative migration, the UN 
adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
Convention on Trans-national Organised Crime, (otherwise known 
as the ‘Palermo’ or ‘Trafficking Protocol’), which came into 
operation as international law in 2003. This document now 
represents the current internationally agreed definition of human 
trafficking, having been ratified by 158 countries (UNODC 2013). 
Article 3 holds that: 
 
‘(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
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by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, 
at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or 
the removal of organs; 
 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the 
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 
article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth 
in subparagraph (a) have been used; 
 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be 
considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not 
involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of 
this article; 
 
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of 
age’. 
 
The Protocol requires that states take ‘measures such as research, 
information and mass media campaigns and social and economic 
initiatives (Article 9(2))’, as well as those that will alleviate 
vulnerability-inducing ‘cause-factors’ such as poverty and lack of 
equal opportunity (Article 9(4)). These provisions on prevention as 
well as others on victim protection are not considered mandatory. 
 
It is also important to note that according to the Palermo Protocol, 
human trafficking comprises multiple definitional facets. It consists of 
‘three basic elements: first, the action (of recruitment, etc.); second, 
the means (of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
etc.); and, third, the purpose of exploitation’.  
 
With regards to Forced Labour, the definitional instrument is the ILO’s 
Forced Labour Convention of 1930 (No. 29). In Article 2(1), ‘forced 
or compulsory labour’ is defined as follows:  
 
‘All work or service which is exacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily’.  
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As this convention was originally intended primarily to 
encourage states to refrain from using the forced 
labour of either their citizens or those under their control, it contains 
a long list of exceptions to the definition, which include military 
service, civic obligations or work in cases of emergency. This context 
is also reflected in the fact that the convention encourages states 
to abolish forced labour ‘in the shortest time possible’, rather than 
immediately. 
 
Subsequent developments in the international legal regime around 
forced labour included the ILO’s 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 105), which further specified that forced labour 
can never be used as a means of political coercion or education, 
as punishment for expressing political views or for participating in 
strike action, as a tool of labour discipline, or of racial, social, 
national or religious discrimination. Crucially, as was noted in the 
2007 General Survey submitted to the International Labour 
Conference, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has made clear that 
the transitional period to which the 1930 convention referred is no 
longer applicable. 
 
Though these conventions placed an early emphasis on forced 
labour extracted by the state, they were also designed to prevent 
forced labour by private citizens, and it is now widely recognized 
that most coercive labour takes place in the private economy. In 
this context, it is important to recognize, as does the ILO’s General 
Survey and its Estimate of Forced Labour, that the definition of 
forced labour contains three key elements (p.19):  
 
‘First, some form of work or service must be provided by 
the individual concerned to a third party; second, the 
work is performed under the threat of a penalty, which 
can take various forms, whether physical, psychological, 
financial or other; and third, the work is undertaken 
involuntarily, meaning that the person either became 
engaged in the activity against their free will or, once 
engaged, finds that he or she cannot leave the job with a 
reasonable period of notice, and without forgoing 
payment or other entitlements’.  
 
Forced labour is thus not defined by the nature of the work being 
performed (which can be either legal or illegal under national law), 
but rather by the nature of the relationship between the person 
performing the work and the person exacting it.  
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Although this report focuses on what are three nominally different 
practices – forced labour, human trafficking and slavery – it is 
crucial to realise that there are very real overlaps between each of 
these, at both the practical and the conceptual level. Indeed, the 
ILO have argued in the General Survey that forced labour 
encompasses slavery, practices similar to slavery, debt bondage 
and serfdom, and  trafficking in persons for the purpose of 
exploitation, as defined by the Palermo Protocol (ILO 2012:19-20; 
see also ILO 2013, para. 35-7). Thus, whilst definitional differences do 
exist – for instance, organ trafficking constitutes neither forced 
labour nor slavery – and while, as Dottridge has argued, it is 
‘probably a hopeless task [to search for] all-encompassing 
definitions and criteria which can be applied to measure whether 
any specific case is “abusive exploitation”’ (2005:691), the links 
between these three forms of exploitation remain significant. As 
such, over the rest of this report, all will be treated to a certain 
degree as interchangeable and thus identifiable using the same 
overarching term – forced labour –  with each representing slightly 
different points at the ‘unfree end’ of  labour relations.   
 
1.2 Definitional Problems and Debates 
 
Though the world clearly possesses a well-established and carefully 
elaborated definitional matrix covering the abuses examined in this 
report, this definitional matrix still remains the subject of intense 
debate, contestation and challenge (ILO 2009:8). In this section, we 
will therefore examine some of the most significant ones. It is 
important to note at the outset that this is not merely an academic 
exercise, nor are these debates simply ‘intellectual’. What 
constitutes ‘coercion’, ‘consent’ or ultimately ‘forced labour’ is 
actually a question of who gets legal protection, in what form, 
under which circumstances, and from which authorities. This is, 
therefore, an inherently political question, and since definitions are 
never fixed or unchanging, but are always the result of ongoing 
discussion, negotiation and campaigning, it is one we must 
continue to reflect on (see also UNODC 2012a).   
 
1.2.1 Consent, Coercion and the Position of Vulnerability 
 
The concept of ‘exploitation’ remains fundamental to 
understanding the kinds of abusive labour practices under 
examination in this report. Yet it is well-known that there exists no 
single, globally-agreed-on definition for what exactly exploitation is, 
or for where one draws the line between ‘legitimate’ and 
illegitimate/exploitative labour (ILO 2009:8). In the absence of a 
 
 
7 
 
clear definition, the dividing line between exploitative 
and un-exploitative labour is commonly taken to 
reside at the point where consent becomes coercion, and where 
labour is no longer ‘freely’ given. Here too, however, there is a lack 
of clarity, since most labour theorists and the ILO agree that there 
can be no absolute binary between free and forced labour; rather, 
they accept the existence of a continuum (ILO 2009:8-9, Lerche 
2007: 443).  
 
This definitional fluidity represents an understandable response to 
the messiness of real-world situations; however it does not solve the 
very practical questions of who or what can be guilty of coercion, 
of how that coercion can be manifest, and thus of what 
responsibility authorities have to protect against it. The ILO’s 2007 
General Survey, for instance, asserts that:   
 
 ‘An external constraint or indirect coercion interfering 
with a worker’s freedom to “offer himself voluntarily” may 
result not only from an act of the authorities, such as a 
statutory instrument, but also from an employer’s 
practice…However, the employer or the State are not 
accountable for all external constraints or indirect 
coercion existing in practice: for example, the need to 
work in order to earn one’s living could become relevant 
only in conjunction with other factors for which they are 
answerable’ (2007:20-1). 
 
On this understanding, coercion and unfreedom exist legally only as 
direct and individualised phenomena, perpetrated by an individual 
employer or by the state. This discounts the generalised ‘need to 
earn one’s living’.  
 
It can be argued however that, when a poor African woman faces 
the choice between starvation or bonded labour, her ‘choice’ to 
opt for bonded labour represents no real choice at all, but rather 
the non-choice of a lesser evil that has been forced upon her by the 
structure of prevailing legal regimes, which for example sanction her 
lack of entitlement to land, financial support, childcare, food or 
other necessary social protection. Seen in this way, debate over 
how one defines ‘consent’ or ‘coercion’ is less an indulgent 
philosophical exercise and more an imperative moral, political and 
practical negotiation over which kinds of coercive pressures are 
considered legitimate and illegitimate in labour relations (ibid.16; 
see also Steinfeld 2001), and thus over which kinds of social 
protections national and international authorities have a duty to 
provide. It is not simply that ‘labour rights are human rights’ (Alston 
2005), it is also that socio-economic rights underpin the kinds of 
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labour conditions that human beings will have to accept, and 
consequently the kinds of human rights that they can expect to 
enjoy.  
 
This is increasingly being recognised by those involved in anti-forced 
labour work and has been reflected in discussions around the legal 
concept of ‘the abuse of a position of vulnerability’, included in the 
Palermo Protocol as one of the ‘means’ by which trafficking can 
take place. For many years, ‘the abuse of a position of vulnerability’ 
remained an abstract and un-defined concept, with anti-trafficking 
or anti-forced labour actors unsure of how to operationalise it. The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has recently 
responded with an Issue Paper examining the question. The paper 
acknowledges that ‘vulnerability’ is a fluid term denoting an 
individual’s susceptibility to exploitation, and it underlines that 
susceptibility is conditioned by factors which are both legal and 
non-legal in character1. Crucially, the paper highlights that abusing 
a ‘position of vulnerability’ means taking economic advantage of 
‘any situation in which the person involved has no real and 
acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved’. 
Implicitly, therefore, it acknowledges the role that governments play 
in creating the conditions under which workers have an alternative 
to the exploitative working relations to which they have to submit 
when the unscrupulous are prepared to take advantage of their 
penury (2012a).  
 
1.2.2 Forced Labour of Children 
 
The question of coercion and consent is also subject to significant 
debate when it comes to child labour. Though ‘there is no specific 
definition of what constitutes forced labour of children’ (ILO, 
2012:16), in the ILO’s Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour, 
forced child labour is operationally defined as ‘work performed by 
children under coercion applied by a third party (other than by his 
or her parents) either to the child or to the child’s parents, or work 
performed by a child as a direct consequence of their parent or 
parents being engaged in forced labour’ (ibid.17). This definition 
recognises that a child’s dependence on its parents can lead the 
child to become a victim of forced labour when the parents are 
themselves already victims. It also recognises the centrality of 
                                                 
1 They include (2012a:20): ‘age (youth and, to a lesser extent, old age); irregular legal / migration status (including threats 
to disclose information about irregular / legal migration status to authorities); poverty; precarious social status; pregnancy; 
illness and disability (mental and physical); gender (typically being female, but also transgender); sexuality, religious and 
cultural beliefs (notably practices commonly referred to as juju and voodoo); linguistic isolation; lack of social networks; 
dependency (on employer, family member, etc); threats to disclose information about the victim to his or her family or 
others; and abuse of emotional / romantic relationship’ 
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coercion or ‘involuntariness’ when distinguishing 
‘forced child labour’ from simple child labour.  
 
This distinction is important, since not all child labour involves force 
or coercion. The two instruments defining child labour are the 1973 
Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) and the 1999 Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention (No. 182), which identify child labour as all 
work performed by anyone under the age of school completion – 
usually 14 – as well as all work performed which by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out is deemed to be detrimental 
to the child2. Child labour is thus defined separately from forced 
labour and the presence of coercion or force is crucial to that 
separation – as is attested by the category of the ‘Worst Forms of 
Child Labour’, which include extremes such as forced or compulsory 
labour, slavery or practices similar to slavery, the sale and trafficking 
of children, debt bondage or serfdom.  
 
Conflict and debate arises around these definitions, however, 
because the notion of ‘“offering oneself voluntarily” must be 
interpreted in light of the fact that, in legal terms, a child below the 
age of legal majority cannot him or herself give consent to work’ 
(ibid.), and certainly cannot give consent to work that has been 
deemed by authorities other than him or herself to be exploitative3. 
As such, in legal terms, even child labour which is not forced labour 
and does not involve coercion is treated as de jure forced, and 
even in circumstances where the child has meaningfully offered 
their consent. This has, as we shall see in the following chapter, led 
to policing efforts that treat certain kinds of child labour as if it were 
forced labour. 
 
Many of the world’s leading child rights experts argue that this is 
problematic. Professors Bourdillon, Levinson, Myers and White, for 
example, are paradigmatic in their suggestion that law and policy 
should build on the requirement established in Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) that young people 
capable of forming and expressing their views should have those 
views taken into account, including with regards to the work that 
they do (2011). They argue that although some work should always 
and everywhere be deemed illegal (for adults as well as for 
children), adolescents who are sufficiently mature and responsible 
should be given the right to decide whether or not they engage in 
work that is understood by officials as exploitative, since it is they, 
rather than those officials or the distant drafters of international 
conventions, who are best placed to decide on whether it is in their 
                                                 
2 See also the Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the Status of the Rights of the Child, 
A/64/172, dated July 27 2009. Paragraph 7, in particular. 
3 See, for instance, Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol. 
10 
 
best interests.  In other words, their work should not be understood or 
policed as du jure forced. This is particularly relevant in a context 
where people face economic hardship, and where young people 
often reach social adulthood at an earlier age and so are required 
and expected to contribute economically sooner than their peers.  
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Chapter 2 - What we know, and what 
we do not know 
 
Having established the existing definitions and addressed the 
prevailing definitional debates, this chapter will offer an overview of 
the current state of knowledge around what are understood as 
forced labour, human trafficking and slavery in Africa. It will begin 
with a brief discussion of magnitude and general trends. The 
chapter will then examine certain examples in further detail, 
drawing on empirical evidence from different countries and 
different economic sectors. The overall message that the chapter 
will present is that while authoritative estimates have been made, 
and despite the existence of some good quality data, our 
understanding in this area is still in need of strengthening.   
 
2.1 Overview of Current Knowledge 
 
The ILO’s Global Estimate of Forced Labour, which includes cases 
that could be considered slavery or human trafficking, suggests that 
as many as 3.7million Africans may live in situations of forced labour 
today:  
 
 
  Source: ILO, Estimate of Forced Labour, 2012, p14 
 
 
This figure places Africa as the second of the world’s regions in terms 
of forced labour prevalence:  
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Source: ILO, Estimate of Forced Labour, 2012, p15 
 
As with the rest of the world, it is believed that most of this forced 
labour takes place in the private economy. Indeed, 90% of forced 
labour is extracted by individuals or enterprises, as compared to 
only 10% by political authorities. One in five victims are believed to 
be exploited for their sexual labour, and women and girls are said to 
make up 55% of victims. Under-18s represent a quarter of forced 
labour victims, and in recent decades there has been an enormous 
increase in attention to apparent ‘child victims of trafficking’. More 
generally, migrants account for a little over 40% of all forced labour 
victims. In total, billions of dollars are said to be lost both to the world 
and the global economy, as wages due to coerced labourers go 
unpaid (ILO 2009).  
 
In terms of causality, it is commonly asserted that ‘poverty and 
tradition’ are the major causes of forced labour in Africa, with 
unscrupulous employers and weak state capacity or regulatory 
failure also cited as significant. This analysis dovetails with 
academically established theories of crime, including that of Cohen 
and Felson, who see crime as the result of three combining factors: 
a suitable target, a motivated offender, and the lack of a capable 
guardian (in Andrees and Besler, 2009).  
 
In the case of African forced labour, the ‘suitable target’ is 
constituted by the large supply of workers who are poor and 
vulnerable enough to be easily exploited, either because they are 
desperate for work or because traditions of servitude such as those 
found in certain West African countries continue to operate 
(Kamara 2000, Urs 2000, Botte 2005). With regards to ‘motivated 
offenders’, there is no doubt that some employers will use any 
means necessary to turn a profit. Research suggests that this is 
particularly the case in low-skilled, highly labour-intensive activities 
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such as domestic or sex work, agriculture or 
construction. There is a clear economic rationale to 
this: first, low-skilled activities rely more on work intensity than on skill, 
and so typically involve less educated, poorer workers who can be 
forced to work harder for want of a lack of alternatives. Second, it is 
in these labour-intensive sectors that the savings on labour costs 
which accrue to force will have the relatively highest impact on 
profits. Finally, with regards to the absence of a ‘capable guardian’, 
it is weak state capacity that is often blamed. In this, the state’s lack 
of resources and consequent inability to enforce laws, provide 
labour inspectorates or train effective police forces, mean that 
vulnerable workers operate without adequate protection, thus 
further facilitating their exploitation.  
 
This analysis needs to be placed within a wider context to allow for 
a nuanced understanding of the domestic African dynamics which 
underpin forced labour (2013:1), since forced labour represents an 
inherent part of ‘the underside of globalisation’ (ILO 2009:2), and is 
linked to exogenous factors originating outside of Africa and often 
operating beyond African control (Van den Anker 2004, Bales 2005).  
 
The rest of this chapter will attempt to move beyond those where it 
can and to highlight them where it cannot, focussing in detail on 
specific examples of forced labour in Africa, and examining those 
economic sectors said to be most affected. Further basic details 
can be found in the Appendices. 
 
2.2 Specific Sectors and Examples 
 
The following sub-sections examine case studies of forced labour in 
Africa today. The discussion will highlight both what we do know 
and understand about these individual cases and also what we do 
not know or have mistaken. 
 
2.2.1 Government Forced Labour  
 
ILO Convention 29 was designed primarily to push governments to 
end their use of forced labour. The massive post-colonial reduction 
in state-extracted labour on the African continent suggests that this 
effort has largely been successful. Indeed, in contrast with the 
situation at the turn of independence, it is now believed that only a 
minority of forced labour victims in Africa today can be said to be 
victims of their own political authorities.  
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However, recent research, the work of international campaigners 
and that of the ILO suggest that there are exceptions. First amongst 
these are the many documented cases of prisoners being forced to 
labour while incarcerated under conditions which violate ILO’s 
Conventions. In Uganda, for instance, the CEACR has repeatedly 
noted the presence of legislation authorising compulsory labour as 
a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views 
ideologically opposed to the establishment. In particular, the 
Committee has been concerned with the following Ugandan 
legislation: 
 
 the Public Order and Security Act, No. 20 of 1967, 
empowering the executive to restrict an individual’s 
association or communication with others, independently of 
the commission of any offence and subject to penalties 
involving compulsory labour; 
 sections 54(2)(c), 55, 56 and 56A of the Penal Code, 
empowering the minister to declare any combination of two 
or more people an unlawful society and thus render any 
speech, publication or activity on behalf of, or in support of, 
such combination illegal and punishable with imprisonment 
(involving an obligation to perform labour). 
 
As the Committee has pointed out, any penal sanctions involving 
an obligation to perform prison labour are contrary to Convention 
No. 105 when imposed on persons convicted for expressing political 
views or views opposed to the established political system4. Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) have documented the implementation of this 
legislation, noting that ‘thousands of prisoners are forced to work 
under brutal conditions, frequently beaten or abused for moving 
too slowly or refusing to work5. Similar testimonies and concerns 
have been raised in Egypt6 and Zimbabwe7. 
 
Serious concerns have also been raised of a number of countries in 
which compulsory community service or development work is said 
to be extracted by the state. In Algeria, for example, the CEACR has 
for a number of years drawn attention to the incompatibility with 
Convention No. 29 of sections 32, 33, 34 and 38 of Act No. 84-10 of 
11 February 1984 concerning civil service, as amended and 
supplemented by Act No. 86-11 of 19 August 1986 and by Act No. 
06-15 of 14 November 2006, under which it is possible to require 
                                                 
4 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2699298; In this regard, it is 
worth noting that under Convention No. 29, prison labour imposed on persons convicted to prison sentences is not 
considered forced labour on the condition that a number of safeguards are respected. 
5 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/uganda-forced-labor-disease-imperil-prisoners 
6 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2337054:NO 
7 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3064281;  
see also http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/36104/mliswa-uses-prison-labour-on-farm.html 
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persons who have completed a course of higher 
education or training to perform a period of civil 
service ranging from one to four years before being able to exercise 
an occupation or obtain employment. The Committee has noted 
that, under sections 32 and 38 of the Act, any refusal to perform civil 
service and the resignation of the person concerned without valid 
reason results in the prohibition on their exercising an activity on their 
own account, and that any infringement will incur the penalties laid 
down in section 243 of the Penal Code (imprisonment ranging from 
three months to two years and/or a fine of between 500 and 5,000 
dinars)8.  
 
A serious instance of government-exacted ‘community service’ in 
Africa is Eritrea. The CEACR has repeatedly expressed its concerns 
and sought reassurances or reforms9. Research suggests that these 
have not, however, been forthcoming. According to HRW, the 
Eritrean government regularly assigns conscripts to state-owned 
companies, such as the Segen Construction Company, who are 
then ‘subcontracted’ or hired out to work for foreign companies in 
international mining operations (2013). Many of these conscripts are 
ordinary citizens compelled by what HRW terms ‘the Eritrean 
government’s uniquely abusive programme of indefinite forced 
labor – the inaptly-named national service programme’ (ibid.3).  
 
Professor Gaim Kibreab, an Eritrean national working in the UK, has 
conducted detailed research into this national service program 
(NSP). He explains that it and the related Warsai-Yikaalo 
Development Campaign (WYDC) ‘were conceived and 
implemented as instruments for creating a cohesive national 
identity, as well as moulding a political community’, in light of the 
war and continued tensions with neighbouring Ethiopia (2009:43). 
Initially, there was much support for the programme, in particular 
since it was believed that ‘the danger of multi-ethnic and multi-faith 
“chaos” [could] be avoided by inculcating national values on the 
hundreds of thousands of conscripts who originate from disparate 
ethnolinguistic groups’ (ibid).  
 
Despite these valiant goals, however, evidence suggests that the 
past decade has seen the NS and WYDC quickly deteriorate into 
mass-scale forced labour and political persecution. The Eritrean 
government has indeed legally enshrined the extraction of NS 
labour even ‘under the threat of penalty’. As Kibreab explains 
(ibid.57), the Proclamation on NS holds that:  
 
                                                 
8 See also Paragraphs 89 and 90 of the ILO’S 2007 General Survey, as well as Paragraphs 282-285 of the 2012 General 
Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights at Work for further details on this issue. 
9 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2337201:NO 
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‘penalties imposed for noncompliance consist of a fine, or 
a term of imprisonment of up to five years, or both. The 
five years penalty applies to those who escape abroad to 
avoid national service (Proc. 82/1995, Art. 37). The 
proclamation also stipulates that draft evaders’ and 
deserters’ “rights of license, visa, land tenure, and the 
rights to work will be suspended” until the age of fifty 
(ibid., Art. 37)’. 
 
The International Trades Unions Confederation (ITUC) shares 
Kibreab’s assessment, concluding that the Eritrean state extracts 
labour from citizens through widespread coercion10. 
 
2.2.2 Compulsion in Conflict 
 
Labour compulsion in the context of conflict is also said to be 
prevalent in a number of African countries. As the ILO’s 2007 
General Survey states:  
 
‘Though the physical abduction of persons for slavery and 
forced labour purposes is no longer common, it still takes 
place in a situation of armed conflict in certain regions. Thus, 
over the past decades the Committee has been examining 
information concerning the practices of abduction, 
trafficking and forced labour affecting thousands of women 
and children, and also men, in the context of civil conflicts in 
a number of countries. The Committee has observed that 
the situations concerned constitute gross violations of the 
Convention, since the victims are forced to perform work for 
which they have not offered themselves voluntarily, under 
extremely harsh conditions, combined with ill-treatment 
which may include torture and death, as well as sexual 
exploitation’ (p.36). 
 
Most prominent among such cases in recent years has been that of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the second joint report 
of seven United Nations experts on the situation in DRC, the experts 
noted that the mines in the Kivu provinces continued to be 
exploited by armed groups, especially the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and expressed their 
concern at ‘reports that civilians are still subjected to forced labour, 
extortion and illegal taxation, and that sexual exploitation of women 
and girls is rife in these mining areas’. The report also emphasizes 
that ‘women and girls have been abducted and held as sexual 
                                                 
10 http://www.refworld.org/country,COI,ITUC,ANNUALREPORT,eri,,4fd88951c,0.html 
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slaves both by FARDC members and other armed 
actors, and have been subject to collective rapes for 
weeks and months, often accompanied by additional atrocities’11.  
 
The Confederation of Trade Unions of Congo (CSC) and the ITUC 
have made similar observations, presented to and noted by the 
CEACR. The former have ‘confirmed the practices of abduction of 
women and girls and, to a lesser degree, of men and boys with a 
view to their being used for forced labour and sexual slavery by the 
armed groups’. They have also documented ‘elderly 
women…being abducted for domestic work’12. Likewise, the ITUC 
have confirmed: 
 
‘the persistence of cases of sexual slavery, especially in 
mines in the regions of North Kivu, Province Orientale, 
Katanga and East Kasai, perpetrated by illegal armed 
groups and elements of the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). The ITUC 
emphasizes that the persons concerned have no chance of 
escaping because they are guarded 24 hours a day by 
soldiers. The ITUC also refers to several cases of the forced 
enrolment of boys and young men by various armed groups, 
especially by the troops of Bosco Ntaganda, in the Masisi 
territory, or by the rebels of the M23, in particular in the 
province of North Kivu. The ITUC lists several attacks carried 
out by these groups in 2012 in various communities in this 
province, during which violence was systematically used to 
force civilians to transport arms, ammunition, booty from 
looting and other provisions up to the front line’13. 
Similar reports have been documented in a range of other 
countries, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, 
South Sudan and Uganda. In each of these countries, the armed 
group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has for many 
years carried out attacks and atrocities on civilians, including 
repeated abductions of children. Though LRA activities have 
declined, the group are still at large and research has 
demonstrated that the children abducted by them have been 
forced to stay with the group as forced recruits or sexual slaves. 
Estimates as to the number of children abducted by the LRA are 
commonly in the tens of thousands. 
                                                 
11 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-63.pdf 
12 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3084220 
13 Ibid. 
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Armed groups and state militias beyond the LRA are also said to 
forcibly recruit adults and children into their ranks in the CAR and 
Sudan. In CAR, the UN Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict 
in the CAR ‘noted in his report that the recruitment of children by 
armed groups remains a source of serious concern, especially in the 
north-east and east of the country (paragraph 15). The report 
reveals that children are still among the ranks and continue to 
engage in combat with various armed groups, namely, the Armée 
Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la 
Démocratie (APRD), the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le 
Rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice 
et la Paix (CPJP), the Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains 
pour la Justice (MLJC) and the Front Démocratique du Peuple 
Centrafricain (FDPC)14.  
In Sudan, continued unrest in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Abyei 
has also led to a number of documented forced labour-type 
atrocities, despite government commitments to ensure prevention. 
With regard to Darfur, the report of the Secretary-General on the 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
of 17 April 2012 indicates that, between December 2011 and April 
2012, clashes between different forces occurred sporadically, 
leading to ten incidents of kidnappings involving local residents and 
three documented cases of abductions. In Southern Kordofan, the 
13th periodic report of UNOCHR notes that the Human Rights 
Component of the United Nations Mission to Sudan received several 
reports of alleged abductions or disappearances of people in the 
region15. Tensions are still high today, and the risk remains of such 
atrocities being repeated. 
 
2.2.3 Sexual Exploitation 
 
The previous section noted the frequent forced sexual exploitation 
of women and girls in the context of conflict. Forced prostitution 
and other forms of sexual exploitation are not, however, only 
confined to conflict situations. Indeed, the ILO’s latest Global 
Estimate of Forced Labour calculates that as many as 22% of the 
overall worldwide total of forced labourers may be victims of forced 
sexual exploitation (2012:13), which in Africa points to potentially 
hundreds of thousands of women and girls.  
 
                                                 
14 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2700690 
15 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3065391 
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Zimbabwe is often identified as paradigmatic of a 
country affected by this issue. On the basis of its 
enquiries, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) declared in 2012 that it was ‘concerned 
at the continuing prevalence of trafficking in women and girls in the 
country, at the lack of statistical sex disaggregated data, as well as 
at the low reporting rate’. Additionally, it lamented ‘the State 
party’s failure to address the root causes of trafficking and 
prostitution, including poverty, which impede the State party’s 
efforts to address these issues in a serious way’, along with ‘the lack 
of shelters and counseling services in the State party for victims of 
trafficking and prostitution’16.  
 
Though these reports demonstrate the existence of recent data on 
the trafficking and sexual exploitation that takes place within Africa, 
most of the best contemporary research pertains to the ways in 
which African women are tricked or coerced into becoming sex 
workers outside of the African continent. The ILO’s recent report – 
Tricked and Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East – is a 
good example of this recent work. It examines the ways in which 
migrant domestic work can often be linked to sex trafficking in the 
Middle East (2013). Sometimes, it explains, Ethiopian women will 
migrate legally to become maids in Middle Eastern households, only 
to find their passports confiscated and their work very different from 
that which they expected. At other times, a woman employed as a 
maid may find her experience so abusive and exploitative that she 
flees for her own safety. Then: 
 
‘Having left the workplace without the employer’s prior 
consent, these domestic workers, most of whom come 
from Asia or Africa, are at risk of detention and 
deportation by the national authorities. They are therefore 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation by their boyfriends 
or sex brokers (pimps); sometimes they are even 
abducted outright by fellow migrant taxi drivers whom 
they approach for help, who see them as a commercial 
asset’ (ibid. 58). 
 
Other cases of sex trafficking are said to exist where migrant women 
know in advance about the kinds of work that they will doing, but 
find that work exacted under a contract that resembles debt 
bondage. The most frequently cited case of this is that of Nigerians 
in Italy. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(UNICRI) has collected evidence about the pressures applied to 
Nigerian women who earn money in Italy from commercial sex. The 
                                                 
16 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-ZWE-CO-2-5.pdf 
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report notes that some Nigerian women arrive in Italy to be told that 
they owe the people who have organised their travel a debt of 
50,000-60,000 Euros. They find their freedom of movement 
constrained until the debt has been repaid, they face threats of 
supernatural retaliation if they fail to follow orders or to repay their 
alleged debt, and they may experience threats to both their and 
their family’s physical safety if they fail to comply (2003). 
 
2.2.4 Domestic Work 
 
Just as sexual exploitation is a problem that predominantly sees 
women and girls as victims, so too is domestic work, which reports 
suggest is one of the economic sectors most affected by forced 
labour in Africa today. In the CEACR’s comments regarding the 
implementation of Convention No. 29, for instance, concerns 
regarding trafficking for domestic service are raised in countries 
right across the continent.  
 
That domestic work is so closely linked to trafficking and forced 
labour is in itself unsurprising. As scholars have emphasised in 
contexts across the globe, domestic workers are among the most 
vulnerable of any workers in any sector (Anderson 2000). This is for a 
number of reasons. First, their work usually takes place away from 
the eyes either of labour inspectors or at times even neighbours, 
meaning that they are isolated from potential sources of protection. 
Second, given that they are often located far from their personal or 
familial networks, and in places and amidst people whose 
languages may be unfamiliar, their isolation is further compounded. 
Third, domestic workers are often relatively poor and uneducated, 
meaning that they have few livelihood options beyond the abusive 
domestic service that they find themselves in. And fourth, their 
immigration status is often linked to their remaining in their current 
employment, which forces them either to accept abuse or face 
deportation.   
 
An important African case study documenting forced labour in 
domestic service has been conducted by the ILO in Zambia. The 
findings of this study can perhaps be taken as emblematic of the 
situation on the continent. The study deploys an innovative 
methodology examining labour-related complaints received by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) and the Human Rights 
Commission (HRC). It records all complaints over a five year period 
that relate to employment, non-payment of wages, poor working 
conditions, and various other relevant categories. Hundreds of 
cases were compiled and analysed. The study also complimented 
this with semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions with 
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domestic workers, maid recruitment centres and 
victims of trafficking. 
 
What the study found was that, as is the case elsewhere, domestic 
workers are especially hired by middle-class and wealthy 
households and that they mainly come from poor households in the 
peri-urban areas of major towns as well as the rural areas. Legally, 
they are largely unprotected as they work away from labour 
inspectorates and without union coverage. Widespread complaints 
of mistreatment include the ‘salary not being raised after probation, 
delayed payment of salary, lack of rest, finishing work late, no 
overtime allowance for working on public holidays, inadequate 
food or being fed on left-overs, not being allowed to use household 
toilet facilities, and sexual harassment’ (2008a:62). All of this 
constitutes exploitation in most common senses of the term. 
Crucially, violence was also documented in certain cases, while the 
study noted that sometimes domestic workers’ identity cards are 
taken from them, possibly as a means to prevent them from leaving, 
which would certainly class their work as ‘forced’.  
 
2.2.5 Traditional Forms of Slavery 
The issue of ‘traditional forms of slavery’ has received significant 
media, political and academic attention over recent years in Africa. 
Debates around the issue have been highly contentious, and often 
hotly contested, as different bodies claim that slavery either exists or 
does not (see, for example, Kamara 2000, Urs 2000, Botte 2005). As 
Dottridge explains, though slavery and slavery-like practices have 
been formally illegalised for many years across the continent:  
‘Information collected by historians and social scientists 
across the Sahel shows that people of slave status remained 
attached to many pastoralist households when slavery was 
formally abolished, and that the legal abolition of slavery by 
colonial or post-colonial governments did not effectively 
address the predicament of individuals of slave status. In 
some cases the relationships did evolve, but continued to 
involve servitude or a servile status: for example, slaves 
involved in agriculture became share-croppers, giving part 
of their crop to the people for whom they had once worked 
directly. Significant numbers of the descendants of such 
people have, according to some reports, continued living 
and working with the descendants of their ancestors’ 
“owners”’ (2005a:23). 
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NGOs, trades unions and various campaigning organisations have 
documented a wide range of abuses to which such slave 
descendants are subject, including forced labour. The ILO’s CEACR 
has therefore dedicated considerable attention to examining the 
issue, in particular in the cases of Niger and Mauritania.   
While both governments have expressed their readiness to work with 
the ILO to resolve any outstanding problems, and although various 
legal reforms and policy platforms have been put in place, the 
CEACR still has significant reservations. In Niger, for instance, the 
Committee laments the serious lack of enforcement and the lack of 
an effective national strategy17. Likewise, in Mauritania:  
‘The Committee observes that the ITUC emphasizes in its 
observations that it is extremely difficult for victims of slavery 
to overcome cultural and legal obstacles in order to be able 
to lodge complaints and take legal action against their 
masters. The ITUC refers to the reluctance at various levels of 
the administration to enforce the law. Even though several 
victims have attempted to take legal action against their 
masters, only one conviction was handed down in 
November 2011’18. 
Similarly, the Committee cite the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, who states that though she had 
heard of cases of slavery being reported to the relevant authorities, 
these cases were reclassified under the heading of ‘inheritance or 
land dispute’, were not pursued owing to insufficient documentary 
evidence, or saw the complainant retract the case under pressure 
from his or her extended family, master or even the local 
authorities19.  
 
2.2.6 Mining  
 
In recent years, attention to forced labour and trafficking in the 
mining sector has risen sharply. Countries including Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC have 
all been identified as home to adults and children who work in 
mines and find themselves in situations of debt bondage or 
trafficking. It has been well documented that demand for precious 
stones can fuel guerrilla groups mining ‘blood diamonds’. 
                                                 
17 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3078821:NO 
18 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3080704:NO 
19 ibid. 
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Increasingly, forced labour in mining is being linked to 
multi-national corporations in search of precious 
metals such as gold, or for those minerals key to mobile phone 
production, such as coltan20. 
 
In the DRC, the CEACR has noted the prevalence of forced labour 
in coltan mining. A recent high profile report by the NGO, Free the 
Slaves, has identified many cases of coltan-based forced labour in 
East Kivu. Citing over 900 people interviewed by a local partner 
organisation, they suggest that almost 30% of respondents were 
victims of forced labour, while another 23% were victims of debt 
bondage. With debt bondage, they explain that: 
 
‘new workers are required to borrow money to purchase 
food, supplies, and the tools and equipment needed to 
keep them employed, or when they have “inherited” the 
debt of deceased family members. The return on their 
work proves to be insufficient and borrowed money is 
exhausted as the worker struggles to pay for food and 
drink, lodging, medical expenses and in some cases, 
school fees’ (2013:17). 
 
Similar claims have been echoed in countries including Sierra 
Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. In particular, these claims have been 
part of a huge upsurge in attention to the specific problem of 
children trafficked to mines and quarries for stone-breaking or gold-
sifting21. Typical of the coverage that this issue has been receiving is 
an Al-Jazeera report from Ghana suggesting that children as young 
as seven are ‘the manual hands in the mining process’, that they 
have been kidnapped, trafficked, and ruthlessly abused in the 
process22. Or, from Nigeria, that Beninese ‘child slaves’ have been 
kidnapped23 or ‘sold’ by their parents to traffickers who use them to 
crush rocks24. 
 
In contrast to the seemingly well-founded accusations regarding 
DRC, however, an emerging body of academic research is starting 
to bring into question the validity of these claims. In the case of 
Ghana, Samuel Okyere spent months living in and around the 
Kenyasi gold mine, interviewing and observing 57 adolescent 
workers. What he found was that, while work was challenging, it was 
                                                 
20 http://www.verite.org/Commodities/ColtanTungstenTin;  
see also http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals 
21 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Nofutureforenslavedchildrenworkinginmines.aspx 
22 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/africainvestigates/2011/11/201111307453977885.html  
23
http://blaisap.typepad.fr/mon_weblog/2012/02/384-enfants-esclaves-sauvs-des-carrires-dabeokuta-au-nigeria.html 
24
http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=356:abeokuta-child-slaves-working-
nigeriasquarries&catid=67:art&Itemid=369) 
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simply not comparable to the brutal, forced labour-type 
exploitation depicted in media accounts, government 
pronouncements or even in sectoral desk studies25. It involved no 
restrictions on worker movement, no coercion, and no 
underpayment. In Okyere’s words:   
 
‘Overall, the ways in which children worked at the site 
were devoid of abuse, violence, bondage, servitude, 
exploitation and other ills that mark children’s 
employment in such scenarios elsewhere. None of the 
participants mentioned any cases of maltreatment or 
abuse in their work at the site; neither did the researcher’s 
own observations and enquiries reveal anything of that 
nature’ (2013:85). 
 
These findings have been paralleled by research with Beninese 
quarry-working adolescents in Abeokuta, Nigeria (Howard 2012, 
2013). Though the dominant perspective on this has suggested that 
adolescent labour is either coerced or tricked in Abeokuta, none of 
the dozens of teenagers which had been interviewed have ever 
had such an experience. Indeed, having observed them at work,  
the research corroborated what they so emphatically tell anyone 
who asks them – that while their work may be physically 
demanding, it is never any more so than the farm work they would 
legally be doing at ‘home’ in Benin, nor is it ever something to which 
they do not willingly offer their consent. Moreover, in their 
understanding, this work represents the best option available to 
them for earning the money necessary to live. None have left their 
employment empty-handed, and many migrate back-and-forth 
between Benin and Nigeria as finances require. Similarly nuanced 
findings have been presented in a regional action-research project 
led by Terre des Hommes26, thus bringing into question the 
widespread link between artisanal mining and the trafficking or 
forced labour of children. 
 
None of this is to deny that, in certain cases, children as well as 
adults are indeed exploited or forced to work in mines or quarries, 
just as they are in other sectors of the economy. The major point, 
however, is that we need to know what is happening on the ground 
in each case before making policies, since one catch-all narrative 
that links particular economic sectors to forced labour is inaccurate, 
                                                 
25 ‘Child labour in mining and quarrying is in virtually all cases a Worst Form of Child labour because of the extent and 
severity of the hazards and the risks of death, injury and disease. There is no justification – poverty included – for children 
to work in this sector. It is literally back breaking work. It is relatively straightforward, therefore for governments to 
legislate to include mining and quarrying activities on their legally-binding, national hazardous child labour lists thereby 
making them prohibited activities for children” (ILO 2005:1). 
 
26 http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/french/Rapport_FR-web.pdf 
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just as one catch-all policy will therefore likely be 
ineffective. In other words, while some quarries do 
involve unacceptable working conditions, others do not, and while 
some children are forced into quarry labour, many others are not, 
since they are actually socially mature adolescents consenting to 
their work.  
 
2.2.7 Agriculture 
 
Questions over data accuracy and thus policy effectiveness have 
plagued another of Africa’s major economic sectors in recent 
years: agriculture. There is no doubt that agricultural production is a 
site of forced and abusive labour in Africa. Indeed, this is intuitive, 
given how much of the African economy agriculture accounts for 
(65% of the workforce and 32% of continental GDP27), and given 
how reliant agriculture is on unskilled, highly labour-intensive 
production techniques. Clear cases of agricultural forced labour 
have been documented, particularly in Malawi and with tobacco 
production (ILO 2006).  
 
Though forced labour exists in this field, there are many clear 
examples where the assumption of forced labour has proved 
wrong. This is especially the case with cocoa production. Over the 
course of the past decade, dozens of media reports have surfaced 
to claim widespread extreme coercion in the plantations of Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire. Huge pressure has been placed on the major 
cocoa conglomerates to ‘rid their supply chains of child and slave 
labour’. And two US lawmakers – Senator Tom Harkin and 
Representative Eliot Engel – have sponsored the creation of an 
industry-wide Protocol to ‘clean up’ cocoa supply chains.  
 
The Payson Center for International Development and Technology 
Transfer at Tulane University was subcontracted by the International 
Cocoa Initiative (ICI) established under the Harkin-Engel Protocol to 
analyse whether child slavery or trafficking featured in cocoa 
production in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Having conducted two 
nationally-representative, large-scale surveys over two years, what 
they reported in 2011 was that, while under-18s in both Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire do often work in cocoa production, almost always 
they perform only ‘light work’. Moreover, they found it exceedingly 
rare for any under-18s to be forced into work, with only 0.5% 
reporting that they had been. Significantly, and in contrast to the 
dominant assumption that work takes the place of school, the vast 
                                                 
27 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21935583~pagePK:146736~
piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html 
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majority of working under-18s combined both work and school, with 
many admitting that it was precisely their work which afforded them 
the opportunity to continue their schooling (2011, 2011b).  
 
These findings have been echoed by detailed ethnographic studies 
conducted by anthropologists living within the plantation 
communities said to be home to child slaves. Describing plantation 
production as an overwhelmingly small-scale, family-run, cottage 
industry, they found that extreme coercion, trafficking or slavery are 
almost entirely absent in this sector (see for example Berlan, 2004). 
Orlà Ryan has concurred, in her recent book on the subject (2011). 
Once again, therefore, it seems that an absence of good quality, 
accurate, empirical data has allowed for the perpetuation of 
sensationalist and often misplaced claims of forced exploitation. This 
has significant policy consequences, as we shall see in the following 
chapter.   
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
The overview presented in this chapter has offered a brief outline of 
some of what we currently do and do not know about forced 
labour in Africa. It is clear that we have some important data 
regarding the dynamics of forced labour, human trafficking or 
slavery on the continent, just as it is clear that myriad cases of 
forced labour continue to affect thousands of lives. In particular, the 
fact that certain governments extract forced labour from their 
citizens or that conflict is inextricably linked to forced labour-type 
abuses has been irrefutably well documented. Yet it is clear that 
more and better data is needed. This includes, in particular, that 
pertaining to the forced labour of children, who are all too readily 
characterised as victims. It also includes the qualitative, ground-
level information crucial to developing nuanced understandings 
which transcend sensationalist reporting. Such information will be 
essential as we work to improve our efforts to prevent and protect, 
and it is to these efforts that the report now turns.  
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Chapter 3 - What is and is not 
happening in response 
 
This chapter will examine what actions governments, civil society 
bodies and businesses have been taking over the past 15 years 
against forced labour in Africa. These efforts have been 
widespread, diverse and have involved the spending of billions of 
dollars. The chapter will focus in some detail on a number of the 
most significant, while the Appendices offer a long list of the many 
organisations engaged in this field. In line with the critical goals 
underpinning this report, the chapter will also focus at length on 
some of the drawbacks characterising current efforts and on the 
insufficiencies undermining their effectiveness.  
 
3.1 Overview of Official Responses  
 
3.1.1 Governmental Initiatives at national and regional 
level  
 
Most countries in Africa have ratified the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 29), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
(No. 105), the Slavery Conventions, the Convention on the Abolition 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182) and the Palermo 
Protocol. Most also have their own domestic legislative frameworks 
concerning these crimes, meaning that they find themselves 
broadly in line with international legal norms.  
 
Individual national efforts to operationalise those legal norms vary. 
Though they are too numerous to mention in a report such as this, 
they include, in Nigeria, the establishment of a nationwide anti-
trafficking agency (NAPTIP) responsible for border policing, 
detection and repatriation of trafficked workers. In Zambia, they 
involve the launch of The Decent Work Country Programme 
(DWCP), which prioritizes, among others, promotion of decent, non-
exploitative employment, with particular attention to youth, women 
and people living with disabilities; and supporting the elimination of 
child labour, starting with its worst forms. South Africa has established 
the Tsireledzani initiative (led by the National Prosecuting Authority) 
to ensure national compliance with the Palermo Protocol. In Niger, 
the National Committee to Coordinate the Fight against Trafficking 
in Persons and the National Agency to Combat Trafficking in Persons 
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were established in 2012 to provide strategic direction and develop 
programs to fight against trafficking in persons. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Joint Ministerial Committee on the Fight against Trafficking, 
Exploitation, and Child Labour was created in November 2011 to 
better coordinate the fight against exploitation. It is led by the 
Ministry of Labour and brings together representatives from 13 
Ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Family, Women and 
Children, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Mauritania created the 
National Agency to Combat the Vestiges of Slavery and to Promote 
Integration and Poverty Reduction (ANLSESILP) in 2013. The agency, 
signed into law by the President, will expand on existing programmes 
for former slaves and provide alternative livelihoods. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the National Committee to 
Combat the Worst Forms of Child Labour was established in 2006 to 
coordinate activities on prevention, protection, awareness raising, 
capacity building and data collection.While in Ethiopia, the 
government has established the National Anti-Trafficking Council, 
chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and comprising 12 line 
Ministries at Ministerial level. It is also the only Sub-Saharan African 
country to have ratified ILO Convention No. 181 on Private 
Employment Agencies. 
 
Though there is diversity in the national responses to forced labour in 
Africa, the one policy that has united all countries engaged is the 
attempt to raise citizen awareness, particularly around the dangers 
of labour and sex trafficking (ILO, 2013:27). 
 
Various co-ordinated efforts have also taken place between 
countries at the regional level in order to harmonise or advance 
regional policy. In 2006, for example, West and Central African 
states signed the Multilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children in West and 
Central Africa. That same year, ‘The Ouagadougou Action Plan’ 
was adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development, stipulating a three-pronged strategy of prevention, 
provision, and prosecution with regards to human trafficking. The 
African Union Department of Social Affairs (DSA) was tasked with 
advocating the implementation of the plan, and it subsequently 
launched the African Union Commission Initiative against Trafficking 
(AU.COMMIT) in order to do so. As part of this effort, AU.COMMIT 
organized a workshop in Abuja in 2010, pushing for the 
operationalization of the Ouagadougou Action Plan across West 
Africa.  
 
This effort was echoed also by the 2nd ECOWAS Conference of 
Ministers of Labour and Employment (Côte d'Ivoire, April 2009), 
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which endorsed a Strategic Plan of Action for an 
ECOWAS Labour Policy. This Plan has, among other 
issues, placed fighting human trafficking, eliminating forced labour, 
and the removal of discriminatory laws and practices as its priority 
interventions to be implemented from 2009 to 2014.  
 
In Southern Africa too, regional efforts exist. In May 2009, for 
instance, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Ministerial Conference branded trafficking in persons a ‘criminal 
activity’ that requires clear and comprehensive legislation to 
prevent and combat. The Conference subsequently adopted a 
ten-year Regional Strategic Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking 
in Persons, especially women and children. SADC also adopted a 
Labour Migration Action Plan in May 2013. Furthermore, during the 
SADC Employment and Labour Sector Workshop on Labour 
Migration held in August 2013, the Ministers agreed on the need to 
develop a regional labour migration policy. 
 
Beyond Africa’s borders, political partnerships have been 
developing. Recently the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, 
Mobility and Employment endorsed its 2011-2013 Action Plan, which 
aims to support the Regional Economic Communities and 
strengthen their institutional and human capacities to prevent 
trafficking and forced labour, to protect victims, and to prosecute 
perpetrators. This has included funding for the many national anti-
trafficking agencies established over the course of the past decade 
and now at the forefront of the fight against the continent’s abusive 
labour practices. 
 
3.1.2 International Organisation Anti-Trafficking 
Programmes 
 
It is not only governments who have been engaged in anti-
trafficking efforts over the past decade in Africa; so too have a 
variety of other bodies, and in particular International Organisations 
(IOs), along with the NGOs they sub-contract. The following sub-
section will highlight two of the most high profile initiatives as an 
illustration of what has taken place. 
 
The first, and perhaps most widespread, has been the ILO’s own 
LUTRENA Programme, which is officially entitled ‘The Programme to 
Combat the Trafficking of Children for Labour Exploitation in West 
and Central Africa’. LUTRENA began in July of 2001 as a multi-donor 
funded programme covering 12 countries in West and Central 
Africa. Its first phase consisted of a comprehensive set of activities in 
each of the programme countries, implemented in stages and 
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aiming at contributing to the effective prevention and abolition of 
trafficking in children for exploitative employment in the region. Its 
main components were: 
- Institutional Development 
- Direct Action 
- Research, Documentation and Monitoring 
- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Joint Action 
 
In practice, this has involved a number of overlapping elements. In 
terms of research, LUTRENA commissioned a number of ‘national 
studies’ into child trafficking, conducted by sub-contracted 
agencies on behalf of national ministries. LUTRENA has also helped 
fund the ministries in question, at times seconding staff or paying 
staff wages, and frequently supporting the establishment of ‘village 
vigilance committees’ to represent and promote the ministries’ fight 
against trafficking at the level of the village. 
 
LUTRENA has also been instrumental in promoting legal 
developments regarding child trafficking in the region, on national, 
bi-national and sub-regional levels, just as it has been in bringing the 
region’s countries together to set up joint plans of action. At the 
ground level, its first phase undertook various sporadic ‘anti-poverty 
initiatives’, on the understanding that poverty is the prime cause of 
trafficking. These included, predominantly, the roll-out of income 
generating activities (IGAs), amongst which we can list activities 
such as textile painting, sewing, simple cosmetics production, the 
production of jewels for women, and cake and pastry shops. 
 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)’s Southern African 
Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme (SACTAP) is another 
example of a large-scale and well-funded IO anti-trafficking 
initiative established in recent years. It commenced in 2003, and is 
said to be a key player in Southern Africa’s efforts to tackle and 
respond to human trafficking. Active across the Southern African 
region, SACTAP aims to support and develop the capacity of 
governments and civil society groups to deal with the problem of 
trafficking in Southern Africa, while also offering assistance to victims 
and raising awareness among the general public. 
 
SACTAP is organized around four key components of counter-
trafficking intervention. These are: 
 
• Victim Assistance 
• Capacity Building 
• Research and Data Collection 
• Information and Awareness-Raising 
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In practical terms, what the programme has therefore 
involved are activities similar to those funded under 
LUTRENA. This has meant basic data production, and in particular 
the funding of quantitative studies and their dissemination. It has 
involved massive efforts at awareness-raising, often in partnership 
with NGOs. It has also produced regular information campaigns for 
the general public and published a quarterly bulletin called Eye on 
Human Trafficking for electronic distribution. 
 
SACTAP has worked closely with government and law enforcement 
officials, both contributing to the human trafficking legislative 
process through consultation with policy drafters and/or Law Reform 
Commissions in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, 
and building the capacity of law enforcement and other 
government officials, as well as civil society groups, through training 
and the provision of other technical support. 
 
Uniquely, SACTAP has also worked directly with identified victims of 
trafficking, providing trafficked persons with safe accommodation, 
medical and psychosocial assistance, and a range of return and 
reintegration options. 
 
3.1.3 Private Sector Business Engagement  
 
International organisations and NGOs have been accompanied in 
the recent fight against forced labour in Africa by businesses and 
business-focussed initiatives, which are now among the most high-
profile initiatives of all those designed to fight against abusive 
labour. Of the many of these that exist, there are two that have 
been most effective at mobilising public and media attention. These 
are the Fairtrade Campaign and the International Cocoa Initiative 
(ICI). 
 
The ICI has been briefly discussed above. It came into being in 2001, 
after a spate of media reports accused chocolate multi-nationals of 
benefiting from (child) slave labour on the cocoa plantations of 
West Africa. This led the US House of Representatives to pass a rider 
to an agricultural appropriations bill that would have had the US 
Food and Drug Administration create ‘slave free’ labelling 
requirements for cocoa products. The cocoa industry strongly 
objected to such state regulation, and after much negotiation, 
therefore agreed to sign the Harkin-Engel Protocol, which 
established a self-regulation mechanism by which the cocoa 
industry would itself assure that slavery and the worst forms of child 
labour were absent from its procurement chains. The ICI was the 
body created to oversee and sustain this process, and it represents 
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the apex of ‘one of the first agreements to self-regulate an industry 
in American history and one of the first times the strategy has been 
used to address an international human rights problem outside of 
the law’ (Payson Center, 2011:13). 
 
The Fairtrade Campaign, by contrast, concentrates less on directly 
shaping large-scale business practice itself and more on influencing 
consumer choices as an indirect mechanism for then shaping that 
business practice. The movement emerged originally in the 1960s as 
a consumer-based attempt to address the structural inequalities 
underpinning North–South trade relations. It focused heavily on the 
use of labeling, as a tool for demonstrating to consumers that the 
product they were purchasing and paying a premium price for was 
produced under conditions and for a price that were fair to the 
primary producer. As Freidberg explains:  
 
‘Its original and still defining purpose is the fair price: it 
guarantees producers a price pegged above the world 
market’s and shielded against market volatility…The labels 
assure consumers not only that the producers of their 
coffee or bananas are receiving a price premium (i.e. fair 
trade banana producers receive $1.75 per box above the 
world market price) and that they are investing this 
premium in “social and environmental projects” (Raynolds 
2000: 301), the labels also certify that the producers, 
whether they are peasant co-operatives or plantations, 
meet specified labour and environmental standards, and 
undergo regular inspections by independent monitors’ 
(2003:30). 
 
The Fairtrade brand – and, crucially, its massive commercial 
popularity and success – thus places pressure on the large multi-
national businesses purchasing commodities from primary producers 
in Africa and across the Global South to ensure that those producers 
work in conditions and receive prices which are deemed fair. This of 
course includes being free from forced labour and the poverty-
underpinned compulsion to exploit or allow exploitation. That a 
giant corporation such as Starbucks has committed to purchasing 
Fairtrade coffee is testament to the power this campaign wields. 
And in recent years, it has inspired parallels, of which the UK-based 
Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) is the most influential. The ETI’s goal is also 
to use trade to help ‘make substantial improvements to the lives of 
poor working people around the world’. Membership includes NGOs 
and large Western retailers, all of whom are ‘required to bring their 
supply chains into compliance with ETI’s “base code”, which draws 
on the International Labour Organization’s standards for, among 
other things, working conditions, wage levels and child labour’ 
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(Freidberg 2003:30). As with Fairtrade, ETI is thus about 
consumer-inspired, self-regulatory, standard-setting for 
large-scale business and the small businesses they work with. 
 
3.2 Drawbacks with Current Approaches 
 
Though, as the above sections should have made clear, there is a 
plethora of initiatives attempting directly or indirectly to fight against 
forced labour in Africa, many of these initiatives face a number of 
challenges to their effectiveness. Moreover, even where efforts are 
effective in achieving the immediate goals they set for themselves, 
major questions remain as to whether or not these will be sufficient 
to achieve the wider goal of eradicating forced labour on the 
continent. The following section will therefore reflect on a number of 
these challenges and questions, drawing on a variety of 
contemporary research to do so.  
 
3.2.1 At Governmental and International Organisation 
Level 
 
3.2.1.1 Lack of Ground-Level Data and Understanding 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the need for reliable, ground-level 
understandings and detailed qualitative as well as quantitative 
research in order for political actors to be able to understand 
forced labour in Africa and therefore build successful anti-forced 
labour strategies. In the absence of this research, such strategies 
can either be misplaced or at times even outright 
counterproductive. Unfortunately, however, it is currently 
undeniable that good quality data on forced labour are at a 
premium everywhere in the world, including in Africa.  
 
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made this very 
clear, in its review of US anti-trafficking work. With regards to data 
accuracy, the GAO asserts that ‘[A]ccuracy is in doubt because of 
methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical 
discrepancies’ (2006:1).  
 
A recent meta-review of all English-language data and research on 
human trafficking conducted by the Institute for the Study of 
International Migration (ISIM) suggests that the reliance on (often 
poor quality) second-hand data is a problem that plagues the 
entire field. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the ISIM team used 
EndNote software to compile a bibliography of all non-media 
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publications relating to trafficking and written in English (Gozdziak 
and Bump 2008:15). It thus represents the largest aggregation of 
English-language, trafficking-related literature in existence. In total, it 
comprises 741 relevant documents, of which 429 are institutional 
reports and 218 are academic journal articles. Of these pieces, the 
vast majority are second-hand reports, desk reviews and 
prescriptive policy proposals. Relatively few are based on 
‘systematic, empirically grounded’ or theoretically sound research 
(ibid.9). 
 
We saw in Chapter 2 how the lack of this peer-reviewed empirical 
research can lead to the preponderance of inaccurate, 
sensationalist understandings in the mining and cocoa sectors. It 
can also lead to policy strategies that are either ineffectual or 
poorly targeted. The national and regional efforts against child 
trafficking in West Africa are a classic case in point here. Across the 
sub-region, governments, IOs and NGOs operated for much of the 
last decade on the assumption that the best way to protect the 
young from trafficking was to keep them at home, in school, and 
away from labour migration. This assumption was itself based on the 
false premise that young people are always in danger when they 
migrate and that they therefore only migrate when tricked, 
kidnapped, forced by tradition or under the false impression that to 
do so will be beneficial for them. The resulting effort to keep them 
‘at home’ involved (and continues to involve) tens of millions of 
dollars, massive anti-movement sensitisation campaigns, increased 
border patrols and the establishment of ‘village vigilance 
committees’ in countries including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and 
Nigeria. Unfortunately, however, a wide range of academic 
research has shown this effort to have been futile. Young people still 
move in large numbers, they do so because doing so offers them a 
chance to ‘advance’ in the way that staying in their home villages 
does not, and they do so irrespective of the efforts of the authorities, 
who constitute, at best, a misguided nuisance to be navigated 
(Castle and Diarra 2003, Hashim 2003, Thorsen 2007, Dottridge 2007, 
Morganti 2011, Hashim and Thorsen 2011, Howard 2012, 2013). What 
these findings demonstrate, then, is the need not only for more 
comprehensive understandings of what happens before policy is 
put in place, but also for more systematic long-term impact studies 
of how that policy has or has not worked after it has been 
established. 
 
3.2.1.2 Problems with Implementation  
 
National and international policy and project work is not only limited 
by a lack of solid base-data, however; often, policies or projects 
face internal implementation challenges that undermine what they 
 
 
35 
 
seek to achieve. In the African context, this has been 
nowhere better demonstrated than with the ‘village 
committees’ (VCs) that were established across the continent as a 
flagship part of the last decade’s explosion of anti-trafficking 
initiatives. 
 
VCs almost always include a traditional village leader, a religious 
figure, an influential local woman, a young person, and two or three 
other literate and respected individuals. Committee members are 
given child rights training, taught about the dangers of child 
trafficking, and encouraged to make plans of action for both raising 
local awareness against the danger of child migration and for 
preventing that migration, either directly or by alerting the 
authorities. Payment is not offered for those who take part in the 
initiative, since it is understood that ‘local ownership’ is important. In 
countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, committees are often 
provided with a shared bicycle, a loud speaker and a raincoat to 
facilitate their patrols. 
 
In the 10 years since their inception, VCs have been widely hailed 
as an excellent tool for preventing child trafficking and other, 
related abuses. UNICEF, ILO and a broad array of national ministries 
are on record as having offered such assessments.  
 
Some evaluation reports and academic research offer a different 
view, however. Professor Roger Botte is one of the world’s leading 
scholars working on trafficking and slavery in Africa, as well as on 
efforts to combat them. In 2006, he conducted what remains to 
date the most detailed and extensive empirical investigation into 
the effectiveness of VCs as protection tools. In his analysis, 
conducted across three countries and over many months, despite 
the money spent establishing these committees, they are almost 
everywhere ineffective, since they are top-down impositions which 
remain under-funded, overly focused on migrant policing, insensitive 
to the reasons why people move, and thus largely ignored by their 
target populations (2005:4-9).  
 
This assessment has been confirmed by empirical research into the 
working of VCs in Southern Benin (see Howard 2012, 2012a, 2013, 
2013a). The research in question involved detailed observation and 
dozens of interviews with VC members and residents of the villages 
for which they were responsible. What transpired was that many 
villagers are unaware that the VCs even exist; while for others, they 
are merely a nuisance to be ignored or challenged.  
 
This data strongly point towards the need for better policy and 
project evaluation, of which it is no secret that there is a lack in 
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Africa (Dottridge 2007:41). The data also suggest that there is a 
fundamental strategic problem with initiatives such as VCs, which 
devolve the cost of maintenance, first, onto under-resourced states, 
and second, onto local populations who are expected to take 
‘ownership’ and thus work voluntarily. Such a conclusion would 
indeed seem intuitive in contexts of national poverty and material 
deprivation. Unless that deprivation is tackled, and unless resources 
are provided to tackle it, then little is likely to change. 
 
3.2.1.3 Problems With Targeting 
 
As is always the case when implementing actors face serious 
budgetary constraints, the governments and their partner agencies 
involved in recent African anti-forced labour work have had to 
target resources in order to ensure their policy and project 
effectiveness. At times, this targeting has proved successful. At 
others, however, it has not, with the evidence suggesting that this 
has been particularly the case when it comes to awareness-raising 
and targeted poverty alleviation. 
 
Beginning with awareness-raising, then, ‘sensitisation’ and the 
attempt to change people’s behaviour or mentality has been one 
of the most widespread policy tools used in the fight against forced 
labour, both in Africa and elsewhere (ILO 2013:27). Almost every 
government, international agency and NGO has included an 
awareness-raising component in its recent African anti-forced 
labour work. A review of project plans and evaluation 
documentation shows that initiatives in Africa have included 
information caravans, roadside posters, radio programmes, songs, 
films and also school and NGO ‘outreach’ initiatives.  
 
While some of these efforts have been well designed and effective 
in reaching many thousands of people, major problems exist when 
the messages used are either impractical, inaccurate or irrelevant. 
In this respect, it has been notable that for much of the past 
decade, one of the major anti-child trafficking messages to be 
heard in Africa has been ‘do not let your children migrate, because 
migration is dangerous, since it can lead to trafficking’ (Castle and 
Diarra 2003, Botte 2005, Thorsen 2007, Howard 2012, 2013a). The 
major consequence of this simplistic messaging is that people 
ignore the message, and begin to distrust the veracity of the 
messenger.  
 
More often than not, as recent research has begun to demonstrate, 
people know what kinds of work awaits their children when they 
leave, because their children are migrating along well-worn paths 
and within well-established migrant networks that often include 
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relatives or friends (Thorsen 2007, Morganti 2011, Alber 
2011). As such, although some migrants certainly do 
end up in situations of trafficking, slavery, or other exploitation, 
people know that the majority of them do not.  
 
With regards to targeted anti-poverty initiatives the problem is of a 
slightly different nature. There is no doubt that being poor 
contributes to socio-economic vulnerability and that it is the poorest 
people who find themselves most at risk of labour exploitation. This 
was demonstrated theoretically in Chapter 1 and empirically in 
Chapter 2. The logic of reducing poverty as part of attempts to 
protect against and prevent forced labour therefore stands up to 
scrutiny: if nobody is poor then nobody will have to accept awful 
working conditions, and no ‘economic coercion’ will be able to 
push people into forced labour.  
 
In practice, however, targeted poverty-reduction often remains 
highly ineffective, with ‘a stubborn slew of empirical evidence’ 
suggesting that too often it fails to achieve its stated goals 
(Mkandawire 2005:16). At times this failure is due to basic 
implementation complications. This has been demonstrated by a 
number of project evaluations. In one of the most emblematic, the 
team reviewing the first phase of the LUTRENA Programme in 
Ghana concluded that:  
  
'Given the actual situation with regard to program 
resources, orientation and available capacities of those 
partners working with prevention activities, it is 
improbable that the income-generating activities within 
the communities will go beyond the subsistence stage 
and succeed in taking parents of victims or potential  
victims sustainably out of the precarious social and 
material situation which is at the basis of ct risk.' 
  
In their analysis, resources and capacity were too low to make 
much of a difference to reducing vulnerability, especially because 
resources were targeted to individuals in a generalized context of 
poverty. As such, they recommended that 'the program’s limited 
resources would be more efficiently utilized [on] the important 
advocacy and lobbying role of LUTRENA' (ILO-IPEC 2007).  
 
Though implementation problems are an issue, then, more often 
targeting failure is an inevitable result of the internal contradictions 
inherent to targeted poverty reduction strategies themselves. 
Reviewing the global social and development policy shift from 
population-wide ‘universalism’ to ‘targeting’, the former Director of 
the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Thandika 
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Mkandawire, explains that ‘under universalism, the entire population 
is the beneficiary of social benefits as a basic right, while under 
targeting, eligibility to social benefits involves some kind of means-
testing to determine the “truly deserving”’ (ibid.1). He continues: ‘the 
formulation for the case for targeting goes something like this: In the 
face of limited fiscal resources, it is better to target the resources to 
the “deserving poor”’. Given tight budget constraints, actors 
including governments, NGOs and international organizations need 
therefore to ‘do their best under the circumstances’ (ibid.2-3). 
 
The factors which undermine efforts to do the best under the 
circumstances are many and varied. On a technical level, given 
that targeting strategies always rely on some mechanism to 
distinguish between and separate who is poor and who is not poor, 
they always run the risk of error, with some people deserving 
benefits denied them (‘under-coverage’) and others who do not 
deserve them receiving them by mistake (‘leakage’). These errors 
can be attributed to any of the myriad dynamics plaguing the 
technicalities of implementation, ranging from insufficient capacity, 
to corruption, to local political demands and prerequisites, gender 
bias, patronage, and administrative wastage. Inevitably, mitigating 
these issues is itself a crippling impossibility – since it involves high 
administrative costs and the administrative sophistication and 
capacity that frequently do not exist either in poor countries or in 
resource-constrained NGO and IO operations (Srivastava 2004). 
 
Beyond the fact that targeting may therefore be a ‘luxury’ that only 
the wealthy can afford to effectively employ (Mkandawire 2005:11), 
there are a number of other targeting ‘paradoxes’ that reduce the 
effectiveness of targeting vis-à-vis universalist alternatives. First 
among these is that, where targeted poverty-reduction represents 
the anti-poverty policy norm, overall anti-poverty resources tend to 
be reduced. What this means is that, given the assumption that 
targeting has taken care of the poor, political authorities tend to 
allow their tax-and-spend policies to become regressive, promoting 
further inequality at the expense of equity. Second, political support 
for welfare policies such as poverty-relief depends on their 
universality. In other words, at a national level and at the local level, 
on which anti-forced labour projects often take place, non-poor 
‘buy-in’ to redistributive policies that help the poor diminishes when 
those policies are targeted instead of forming part of universal 
schemes such as national healthcare. As Moene and Wallerstein 
conclude in their study on the issue, ‘the optimal policy for the very 
poor is not necessarily a policy that targets benefits as narrowly as 
possible’ (2001:22). 
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Consequently, it should come as no surprise that 
comparative and historical studies of poverty 
reduction conclude that the greatest success in tackling poverty 
has been achieved ‘not by explicitly addressing it but by addressing 
a whole range of issues that positively impacted on poverty or 
impeded the poor from bettering their situation – economic 
development in a broad sense, investment in human capital and 
equity were crucial to rapid eradication of poverty’ (Mkandawire, 
2005:8). It is possible to argue, therefore, that aside from mere 
technical failure, targeted anti-poverty strategies actually make 
things quixotically worse for the poor, by diverting attention away 
from alternative policies that would have more broad-based and 
sustainable effects in their favour.  
 
3.3 Private Initiatives 
 
The last section of this chapter will examine the private, business-
focussed initiatives using ‘self-regulation’ as a tool to protect 
vulnerable workers and prevent extreme exploitation. Though these 
initiatives have been widely commended, they cannot be a 
substitute for properly resourced and implemented statutory 
enforcement mechanisms (ILO, 2013). 
 
3.3.1 Insufficiency 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies and industry self-
regulation initiatives do not exist in a vacuum. They are always and 
everywhere part of the regulatory framework that is determined by 
national and international law. Over the past four decades, states 
have diminished the power of that regulatory framework, reducing 
investment in labour inspection, liberalizing labour laws, and 
promoting the devolved governance of corporate practice onto 
businesses themselves.  
 
However, while scrupulous employers may take their legal and 
moral obligations seriously, unscrupulous ones may not. And in the 
absence of stringent legislation and rigorous state enforcement to 
prevent them from abusing their workers, there is little to stop them 
from doing so28. The major challenge, therefore, is: 
 
‘to find the appropriate balance between the voluntarism 
of most CSR approaches, with their emphasis on codes of 
                                                 
28
 http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/12/new-unicef-guidelines-children-will-fall-flat-withoutbacking- 
business 
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conduct and self-regulation, and the clear legal 
obligation to prevent and eradicate forced labour in the 
private economy, an obligation that requires vigorous and 
effective monitoring’ (ILO 2009:63). 
 
Though we might assume that business leaders will oppose tighter 
legislation and tougher enforcement, not all do. Some have even 
called on states to remain the key players in forming and enforcing 
the legislative framework within which they operate and within 
which they can compliment, rather than replace, state regulation 
and oversight29. The UNOCHCR-authored Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights explain that: 
 
‘States should not assume that businesses invariably prefer, 
or benefit from, State inaction, and they should consider a 
smart mix of measures – national and international, 
mandatory and voluntary – to foster business respect for 
human rights…Guidance to business enterprises on 
respecting human rights should indicate expected 
outcomes and help share best practices’ (2011:5). 
 
One key example of why it makes sense for businesses to want both 
this guidance and the robust, well-enforced regulatory framework 
that underpins self-regulatory mechanisms comes with the issue of 
corporate liability or criminal complicity. As the ILO has noted: 
 
‘Because forced labour is a serious crime, businesses have 
a legal obligation to prevent and eradicate it in their 
company operations, failing which they can be liable to 
criminal prosecutions and sanctions. But there are at least 
two outstanding issues of concern. First, when modern 
supply chains are so complex, there is the question of how 
far a company’s liability should extend. Second, when the 
jurisprudence on forced labour in the private economy is 
still so young, there are bound to be uncertainties and 
“grey areas” as to which business practices constitute the 
risk of forced labour’ (2009:49). 
 
This kind of uncertainty can represent a serious challenge to 
business. Businesses need to have clear lines drawn as to how far 
their ‘human rights due diligence’ has to go and as to how far their 
criminal liability will extend. In the absence of this certainty, they 
may unexpectedly find themselves facing costly criminal 
proceedings brought by employees or, more likely, human rights 
                                                 
29 Engaging business: Addressing forced labour, Meeting sponsored by the US Council for International Business, the US 
Chamber of Commerce and the IOE in cooperation with the ILO, hosted by the Coca Cola Company, Atlanta, United States, 
20 February 2008. 
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advocacy bodies, just as they may experience serious 
reputational damage should abusive employment 
practices for which they have responsibility be discovered30. 
 
3.3.2 Transfer of the Cost of Compliance 
 
Standard-setting and price premiums can raise the prices received 
and labour standards enjoyed by primary producers in Africa. 
However, they do not do so un-problematically. This is because 
these higher prices and better labour standards come at a profit 
cost to Western retailers. But these retailers, by virtue of their huge 
size, their market domination and their price-setting power, are able 
to avoid absorbing those costs by transferring them on to the 
primary producers themselves.  
 
This has been illustrated with an analysis of Kenyan horticultural 
suppliers selling to UK supermarkets. Alongside the ETI, the major UK 
supermarkets purchasing from Kenya belong to the European 
Retailer Fresh Produce Working Group, which has adopted a 
protocol of ‘good agricultural practice’ that aims to ‘bring 
supermarkets’ agricultural suppliers into compliance with standards 
covering not just worker welfare but also food safety, farm chemical 
use, natural resource conservation and wildlife protection’ 
(Freidberg, 2003:31). This has meant that supermarkets now demand 
that their suppliers produce organically, provide crèches for working 
parents’, offer workers the latest protective clothing, and pay 
workers relatively high wages. The contradiction, however, is that: 
 
‘[S]tandards cost, and the retailers are not willing to pay. 
The costs of crèches and clinics and chemical storage 
facilities, of protective clothing and medical check-ups for 
all the pesticide sprayers, of the labour to keep records 
and  monitor workers – all these are borne by the 
supermarkets’ suppliers, meaning the [Kenyan] companies 
themselves…Most outgrowers support the idea of 
providing schools and other facilities for their workers, and 
generally agree with the supermarkets’ standards for 
minimal pesticide use. But while they have invested in 
complying with these standards, the UK retailers have 
                                                 
30 The crucial question which remains unresolved, however, is where exactly one draws the line regarding a businesses 
legal liabilities? Though, as the UNOCHCR notes, international jurisprudence indicates that the current standard for 
corporate complicity seems to be knowingly aiding or abetting the commission of a crime (2011:13), the legal scholar, 
Anita Ramasastry, argues that this should be extended to include the indirect complicity arising when a corporate actor 
benefits from rights violations which it knows have been committed by another party (2002:150). Such an extension would 
have serious implications for the protection of worker rights in countries like Eritrea, since it would compel the foreign 
companies working there to refuse to do business with rights-violating authorities, thus placing economic pressure on them 
to comply with international labour norms.  
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remained flat, leading to shrinking profit margins’ (ibid.34). 
 
The necessary consequence of this squeezing is that while labour 
standards may have been improved for a small number of workers, 
that gain has been offset by the fact that less workers are now 
being employed, as horticultural firms have had to ‘rationalise’ 
production. Additionally, this rationalisation has seen the nature of 
the firms supplying to UK supermarkets change. Where once export 
horticulture was a domestic cottage industry providing income for 
thousands of African peasant farmers, now supermarkets are relying 
more and more on larger-scale, often foreign-owned, mechanised 
operations, thus taking business from precisely the poor communities 
who would most likely benefit from it. Where market forces operate 
and large-scale businesses such as supermarkets are unprepared to 
forgo a slice of their profits to under-write better standards or higher 
primary prices, this seems likely to be inevitable. It thus represents a 
clear lacuna in self-regulatory endeavours. 
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Chapter 4 - Lessons learned and a way 
forward 
 
4.1 Introduction and Overview 
 
The previous chapters of this report have offered a detailed 
overview of what we currently do and do not know about forced 
labour in Africa and what is and is not happening in response. There 
is reason to be encouraged. Comprehensive quantitative estimates 
have been made, some good quality empirical data exists, and 
evidence has been generated around the ways in which people 
find themselves in and experience forced labour. Governments and 
civil society bodies are engaged – and there is an apparent 
abundance of political will that can and must be capitalised on. 
National legal architectures are being strengthened; partnerships 
between countries, across continents, and among state and non-
state actors are increasing; and large sums of money are being 
invested in raising awareness, changing business practices, and 
directly tackling instances of extreme coercion.  
 
Drawbacks remain, however, and these are currently undermining 
the effectiveness of attempts to eradicate forced labour in Africa. 
First among these is the serious deficit in sufficient, nuanced 
understandings either of where and how much forced labour takes 
place, or of what causes it. In particular, the need to link ground-
level instances of abuse with wider structural forces is urgent. 
Currently, we also lack detailed evaluations and impact studies as 
to the success or failure of many of the anti-forced labour strategies 
that have been put in place. Secondly, from the research that 
exists, we know that mainstream anti-forced labour strategies are 
found wanting in a number of ways. Implementation challenges 
linked to programme approaches – notably with the VCs – make 
their success a difficult prospect to imagine. Likewise, where policies 
have failed to tackle the structural underpinnings of forced labour 
or where they have exclusively focussed on business self-regulation 
instead of on the state and inter-state construction of an enforced 
legal framework for worker protection, insufficiencies and gaps will 
always exist.   
 
Over this, the report’s final chapter, we will build on the critical 
analysis offered above and provide a number of suggestions as to 
where we can go from here.  
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4.2 Recommendations 
 
4.2.1 The Basics 
 
Almost no report on forced labour or its prevention goes by without 
mentioning a handful of the most basic measures that can and 
must be taken to improve anti-forced labour work. Most of these 
recommendations are intuitive, and given that they are so widely 
repeated, we will not dwell on them in detail here. They bear brief 
mention, however, since acting on them would undoubtedly 
improve Africa’s fight against forced labour. These basic include:  
 
1) Ensuring that states put in place and respect the appropriate 
legal framework. This includes not only ratifying all the 
relevant international conventions, but also implementing 
them, as well extending legal coverage to vulnerable groups 
such as apprentices and domestic workers, and improving 
labour migration governance. This latter element would 
involve measures to formalise recruitment agencies and 
intermediary services. 
 
2) Making sure that states and their partners direct sufficient 
resources to ensure effective legal enforcement. In the many 
African countries which already have the right laws on the 
books, the resources necessary for effective implementation 
and competent policing are absent. This evidently needs to 
change, and that change will involve states directing more of 
their revenue to this kind of law enforcement, as well as 
donors and partners channelling more of their resources to 
support that effort.  
 
3) Bringing an end to civil conflict. It is undeniable that conflict 
involves massive human rights abuses, including with regards 
to forced labour and sexual exploitation. The sooner actors 
involved in conflict in Africa are able to establish peace, the 
sooner vulnerable Africans will be free of conflict-induced 
exploitation. 
 
4) Strengthening a workers’ stand against forced labour. As has 
been noted elsewhere ‘Trade unions are central partners in 
the fight against forced labour. ILO assistance for the activities 
of a global trade union alliance against forced labour and 
trafficking…has steadily raised awareness of forced labour 
and the role of trade unions in combating it. This work could 
increasingly cascade down to trade union 
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activities…including legal advocacy, capacity-
building activities, and support for designated 
trade union focal points with specific responsibility for forced 
labour and trafficking’ (ILO, 2013:134). A good example of 
effective worker organizing in this regard concerns the case 
of Firestone employees in Liberia, who mobilized to secure an 
end to the employment of young children on company 
plantations31. 
 
5) Improving victim support services. This would involve initiatives 
such as providing shelters and trauma counselling for those 
who have been removed from situations of forced labour, 
offering reintegration packages that help individuals and 
communities, as well as providing witness protection services 
for those who might come forward against abusive 
employers. 
 
Beyond these basics, there are three core recommendations that 
represent undoubted and immediate priorities for reinforcing the 
African fight against forced labour. Each of these will now be 
examined in greater detail, since they represent the overarching 
major shifts necessary.  
 
4.2.2 Get Better Data - Quantitative and Qualitative 
 
The starting point for reinforcing the African fight against forced 
labour is to generate and share as much better quality data as 
possible. Undoubtedly, this data must be qualitative as well as 
quantitative, since it is only through the detailed, ground-level work 
characteristic of academia that policy-makers will be able to avoid 
falling prey to the unsubstantiated reporting.  
 
Similarly, if policy is to be as effective as possible in tackling genuine 
forced labour cases, it is going to need research to elucidate which 
factors constitute the causes of forced labour. These factors may be 
structural – related to economic injustices – or social – related to 
more locally-grounded inequalities and discriminations.  
 
The monitoring and evaluation of existing anti-forced labour efforts 
is also going to be crucial, and improving data quality will have to 
include a massive increase in funding for the detailed examination 
and assessment of current strategies. This is necessary both to find 
out what does and does not work, and also to avoid the negative 
                                                 
31 http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20110176.htm 
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‘unexpected side-effects’ that can arise from un-examined policies 
(Dottridge 2007:41). As the ILO states: 
 
‘While most countries have undertaken some prevention 
initiatives, few of these initiatives have been subject to 
rigorous assessment and evaluation, meaning that the 
lessons of experience cannot be used to inform the design 
of future strategies’ (2013:95). 
 
Urgent efforts are therefore needed to undertake ‘rigorous analysis 
of the strengths and weaknesses, costs and benefits of alternative 
policy choices’ (ILO 2009:74). One potential mechanism that could 
be employed to achieve this goal is the establishment of statutory 
reporting requirements at national and international level, for the 
gathering and dissemination of research and evaluation data to all 
relevant stakeholders. Such an initiative could be funded by 
coordinated IO or donor strategies, in light of how financially over-
burdened low income states often are. A related contribution could 
be the requirement for IOs working on these issues to share their 
monitoring and evaluation reports and other publications with States 
and other public bodies engaged in anti-forced labour efforts. 
 
4.2.3 Increase Labour Protection: Funding and 
Inspectorates 
 
A second major step that African states and their partners should 
take in the fight against forced labour is to step beyond the reliance 
on light-touch regulation or self-regulation and to invest heavily in 
the protection of fundamental labour and human rights by 
guaranteeing labour inspectorates the legal mandate and 
sufficient resources necessary to ensure that rights are respected 
(Shamir, 2012). As the ILO has observed: 
 
‘All over the world, there has been huge investment in 
training police, border control and other law enforcement 
agencies…Yet the key role of labour inspectors, in the 
eradication and prevention of forced labour including 
human trafficking, has so far been overlooked… States 
and other actors have tended to assume that forced 
labour and trafficking are best dealt with through criminal 
law enforcement and procedures, rather than through 
labour law, administration and justice’ (in ILO 2008:v). 
 
This has been short-sighted, since well-resourced labour 
inspectorates are especially well placed to fight against forced 
labour, both in the formal and the informal economies. This is due to 
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the unique blend of methods that labour 
inspectorates have at their disposal. For instance, they 
are free to enter any workplace liable to inspection without prior 
notice (as per ILO Convention No.81). They are also entitled to carry 
out their enquiries unhindered, to examine documentation, and to 
speak with workers alone and away from their supervisors. Finally, 
they are required to investigate any labour complaint without 
revealing the details of the complainant, thus encouraging 
exploited workers to come forward (ILO 2008:20).  
 
Two major limitations need to be overcome in order for labour 
inspectorates to play this potentially decisive role. The first is the 
diminished legal mandate that most have been reduced to. 
Broadening the legal reach of labour inspectors is therefore going 
to be a crucial step for states to take – inspectors need to be 
entitled and required to engage all areas of the economy, 
including the informal. The second limitation relates to the resources 
available for them to do so. As has been noted: ‘In developing 
countries, under-resourced labour inspectorates are usually too 
overstretched to regulate enterprises effectively even in the formal 
economy, let alone informal enterprises, private homes and 
worksites in remote locations where forced labour practices are 
most prevalent’ (ILO 2009:44). A massive re-channelling of resources 
is therefore going to be necessary, with donors in particular helping 
poor states to expand their enforcement capacities.  
 
4.2.4 Advocacy – Bringing the Politics Back In 
 
Our third and final recommendation here is also the most 
overarching. In a sense, it draws together the debates and 
observations that have run throughout this report. It suggests that, in 
order to truly overcome forced labour in Africa, what we need is a 
collective effort towards establishing a fundamental policy shift. For 
too long, forced labour has been treated in a technical manner 
and as a problem of criminality. This is reductive. Because forced 
labour, like any other form of labour exploitation, is fundamentally a 
political phenomenon.  
 
The fact that workers are exploited, or that they are so poor and 
lacking in social protection that they have to accept dreadful 
working conditions as a condition for survival or economic 
advancement is not an artifact of nature. It is, and always has 
been, a result of political decisions that structure the lives that 
people can and do lead. How we define freedom and coercion, 
for example, is a question of convention – conventions over how we 
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distribute resources in society and over what vulnerabilities society is 
prepared to tolerate as acceptable for its poorest.  
 
Similarly, with regards to anti-forced labour strategies, the policy 
choices available to us are themselves fundamentally politically 
determined. The recent reliance on business self-regulation, the 
predilection for targeted poverty reduction or community self-
policing, and the absence of stringent labour rights enforcement 
are all the consequence of political choices to reduce the size of 
the state and to diminish its redistributive role. The fact that some 
states therefore face fiscal constraints is not an exogenous 
phenomenon; it is a consequence of the tax burden they have 
chosen (not) to place on their citizens, just as, in the case of 
relatively poor countries, it is a consequence of the choices made 
by wealthy countries over how much of their own budgets they 
dedicate towards supporting development of their counterparts, 
over how much freedom they allow their corporations when they 
do business, and over how fair they allow the terms of trade to be. 
 
Seen in this way, when asking ourselves how best to protect against 
forced labour, we are really asking ourselves what kind of national 
and global societies we wish to live in (Dowling 2004:201; see also 
Lerche 2008, Graeber 2009). Do we wish to live in a world where 
some people are left unprotected against the brute force of 
economic compulsion? Or do we wish to live in a world where 
social protection is sufficiently widespread that people are ‘free’ not 
to choose the least bad employment option?  
 
These questions have barely been asked in recent decades, and 
when they have been, they have been derided as ‘idealistic’ or 
‘radical’ (Fisher 2009). But there is nothing radical about wishing for 
all people to lead lives of dignity. Indeed, the ILO’s own Declaration 
of Philadelphia puts this goal at its very heart. Nor is there anything 
radical about wishing a policy to achieve its basic goals. And, as 
the evidence suggests, forced labour exists in part because 
resources are so unevenly distributed, just as anti-forced labour 
policies fail for precisely the same reason.  
 
In reflecting on where we go from here, then, the immediate 
answer is that we must re-open the debate over which kinds of 
societies we wish to live in. Once that debate has been re-opened, 
governments and organizations committed to eradicating forced 
labour must advocate for a fairer political-economic future, one 
that involves a greater redistribution of existing resources, and that 
tackles the political root cause of exploitation. The ILO is uniquely 
well-placed to lead this effort, given its tripartite structure and its 
unrivalled history of successful mobilization and public opinion-
 
 
49 
 
forming32. The Decent Work Agenda is a step in the 
right direction. But if that can be coupled with 
systematic analysis, bravery in advocacy, and multi-stakeholder 
advocacy partnerships between all those genuinely concerned to 
eradicate forced labour, then forced labour in Africa may well one 
day become a thing of the past.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 As the Cost of Coercion report notes, the ILO has a powerful history in this regard. The 2005 forced labour estimate, for 
instance, ‘continues to be widely cited, and has served to focus minds at all levels on the need for action. Global press 
coverage of forced labour-related stories has increased more than three-fold between 2004 and the end of 2007.’ Similarly, 
after the ILO’s website on forced labour was launched in May 2007,the number of external visitors had increased tenfold 
by late 2008’ (2009:66). Maupin 2005 and Deakin 2005 offer further important examples here. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Typologies of forced labour in Africa 
 
Mike Dottridge has provided a detailed overview of the kinds of coercion that 
research suggests lead to forced labour in Africa, as well as of the ways in which 
people enter forced labour situations on the continent. The following two tables 
summarise this analysis: 
 
Table 1.  Types of coercion used to make people work for others 
 
1. Threats or actual acts of violence, including abduction, corporal 
punishment, rape and instilling the fear that an individual refusing to 
obey orders might be killed, maimed, beaten or injured. 
2. Threats of retaliation of a political nature, in a situation in which the 
individual requiring another to work is in a position of power, such as a 
traditional monarch or village chief, and can potentially take retaliatory 
action of various sorts or influence others to do so.  Such methods may 
be used both by legitimate authorities, whether traditional or linked to 
the State, and by the unofficial militias which operate with the tacit 
support of government officials in some countries.  There are also cases 
involving armed groups of opposition militias.  
3. Threats (explicit or implied) of supernatural retaliation against an 
individual while he or she is living or after their death. 
4. Economic coercion imposed via a loan and consequent debt (debt 
bondage and pawning), in which the indebted person is led to believe 
that retaliation will occur if they (or their relative) fail to work off a debt 
and the exorbitant interest linked to it. The retaliation may be as simple 
as refusing to give a further loan.  
5. Holding on to a worker’s passport or other official identity documents, 
usually when the worker concerned is outside his or her country of origin 
and fears arrest or other significant problems if found not to be in 
possession of these documents. 
6. Social or economic sanctions such as a ‘social boycott’ - retaliatory 
action taken by both the individual requiring another to work for him 
and by other members of the same social group, such as refusing to 
employ someone, or to give them access to land, or other means of 
production or income-generation.  
7. Invoking the authority of State officials to keep people in their current 
predicament (for example, when employers of forced labour seek the 
support of local government or law enforcement officials in persuading 
workers not to leave). 
8. Geographic isolation that makes it difficult to escape or otherwise 
leave, often associated with an apparent absence of alternative ways 
of generating an income, at least in the same locality. 
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9. Invoking kinship relations, notably implying that someone is giving 
unremunerated labour because they are ‘one of the family’ or a 
member of the household. 
 
Table 2.  Ways in which people enter a situation of forced labour 
 
1. Birth/descent   The person concerned is born into some form of 
servile status, sometimes meaning they may 
subsequently be transferred without their consent 
(or that of their parents) from one household to 
another (“being given away”). 
2. Abduction This occurs particularly in situations of political 
conflict and violence, but also in peaceful 
situations in which there is perceived to be a 
‘market’ for children or adults who have been 
abducted.  In some cases children have been 
abducted for the purpose of an (illegal) inter-
country adoption.  To complicate matters, 
abduction is still a socially accepted way of 
acquiring wives in some regions. 
3. Sale It is rare today to hear of human beings being 
‘sold’, except in the case of women who have 
been trafficked and are sold (sometimes 
auctioned) before reaching their final 
destination.  However, cases of illicit inter-country 
adoption of African children are reported to 
have involved either parents or agents in control 
of young children, taking money in exchange for 
a child. 
4. Marriage  Notably in certain cases of polygamous 
marriage, where a primary reason for getting 
married is to acquire control over a woman’s 
labour. 
5. Debt  Taking an advance in cash or kind and incurring 
a debt, commonly to finance migration, which 
has to be worked off by the person or by a 
relative (traditionally often referred to as a 
‘pawn’), i.e. debt bondage. 
6. Receiving orders 
from individuals 
in authority or 
able to use 
violence 
When a person fears to disobey others in 
authority or those perceived to wield political 
influence or able to mobilise political violence 
(through possession of guns or other weapons), 
whether or not those exercising authority are 
doing so on behalf of the State. 
7. Imprisonment Prisoners convicted for either criminal or political 
reasons are required to work for a private 
individual, such as a prison guard, or enterprise, 
or untried prisoners are required to perform 
forced labour  
8. Deception Parents are deceived by an intermediary who 
recruits their children and promises them a 
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(of migrants or child 
migrants’ parents)  
brighter future or to send their earnings back to 
their parents, and who fails to deliver on these 
promises. 
 
 
  Tables Extracted from Dottridge 2005, pp. 691-5. 
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Appendix b: Examples of actors involved 
in the fight against forced labour in Africa (non-
exhaustive list) 
 
Donors and Non-African Government Agencies 
 
AFD 
DANIDA 
DFID 
USDOL 
USTIP 
Swiss Aid 
 
International Organisations 
 
ILO  
IOM 
UNICEF 
UNODC  
 
International NGOs 
 
BORNE-FONDEN 
CAFOD 
Christian Aid 
Save the Children 
World Vision 
 
African NGOs 
 
Action for Peace and Development 
Activists Networking against the Exploitation of Children 
Abuja Children and Youth International Association of Nigeria 
Africa Youth Growth Foundation 
African Centre for Advocacy and Human Development 
African Foundation For Human Advancement 
African Tourism and Development Organization 
African Youths Initiatives on Crime Prevention 
Africans United Against Child Abuse (AFRUCA).  
Aid the Children Network 
Amazing Grace Children Centre 
Asabe Shehu Yar’adua Foundation 
Association of African Women for Research and Development 
Association Amis Juristes de Djibouti 
Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme 
Association Carre Geo & Environnement 
Association Des Femmes Chrétiennes d'Aide et de Développement 
Association for consultation movement and environnement evaluation 
Association pour la Promotion de la Lutte Contre les Violences faites aux femmes 
Busia Compassionate Friends 
Campaign For Child Rights 
Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance 
Central African Inter-NGO Council - Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique 
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Centre for Child Protection and Rescue 
Challenging Heights 
Children in Need Network 
Child Protection Alliance 
Committee for the Support of the Dignity of Women 
DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights 
Droits Humains Sans Frontières 
Edo State NGO Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
Enfants Solidaires d'Afrique et du Monde 
Eye of the Child 
Federation of Environmental and Ecological Diversity for Agricultural 
Revampment and Human Rights 
Feed the Children 
Foundation Humanus / Humanus International 
Free State Network on Violence Against Women 
Friends of Suffering Humanity 
Ghana NGO Coalition on the Rights of the Child 
Girls Power Initiative 
Global Aid and Development Foundation 
Global Safety and Relief Foundation 
Grassroots Development and Empowerment Foundation 
HO Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission 
Human Rights Information Network 
Human Rights Defenders Solidarity Network - Uganda 
Humanity Development 
Idia Renaissance 
Ikhwezi Women’s Support centre 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution 
International Association of Criminal Justice Practitioners 
International Human Rights & Anti-Corruption Society 
Justice And Peace Commission 
Laboratoire Anticorruption, Anti-Antivaleurs et Anti-fraude 
L'Association pour le Progres et la Defense des Droits des Femmes 
Lesotho Council of NGOs 
Mercy House 
Nan Hua Temple 
Network for Justice and Democracy 
Nigeria-Togo Association 
On Eagle’s Wings 
Pan African Women's Organization 
Project Gateway 
Quaker Peace Centre 
Refugee Consortium of Kenya 
Research and Training For Real Empowerment 
Société d’Appui à la Mise en Œuvre du Droit International 
SOS Violences Sexuelles 
Southern African Anti Human Trafficking Trust  
Temidayo Ogan Child Safety and Support Foundation 
The Foundation for Human Rights and Development 
The International Center for Street Children and Child Trafficking 
Think Youth Independent Association 
Tour Operation et Initiatives 
Usindiso Ministries 
Voice of Change International 
Women and Children Support Initiative 
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Women Protection Organization 
Women's Aid Organisation - Action to Stop Child Exploitation 
WAO – Afrique 
Women's Consortium of Nigeria 
Women’s Initiative for Self-Actualization 
World Voices Sierra Leone 
WOTCLEF 
Young Businessmen Association for Community Development 
Youth and Community Alive Initiative 
Youth Crime Watch of Nigeria 
Youth Crime Watch of the Gambia 
Youth Crime Watch Sierra Leone 
Youth Net and Counselling 
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